On Being Objective About Objectivity in Science by Connelly, R. J.
The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 48 | Number 4 Article 12
November 1981
On Being Objective About Objectivity in Science
R. J. Connelly
Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Connelly, R. J. (1981) "On Being Objective About Objectivity in Science," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 48: No. 4, Article 12.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol48/iss4/12
On Being Obj ecti ve 
About Objectivity in Science 
R. J. Connelly, Ph.D. 
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shore: Basic Metaphysical Issues, 
Professor Connelly was Moody 
Professor of Philosophy at Incar· 
nate Word College where he pres-
ently teaches. He and his wife 
were appointed Danforth Asso-
ciates, effective 1979-85. 
In a recent review of Heraclitean Fire: Sketches from a Life Before 
Nature, Evelyn Fox Keller observes that the author, Erwin Chargaff, is 
"a scientist with a different mission. He wishes to use his life as a levee 
against the corruption of contemporary science, a corruption he 
thinks is endemic to our times." 1 Chargaff may be mistaken about the 
degree of corruption, but his own personal suffering within the scien-
tific community serves to remind us that science is a human activity, 
limited, and subject to human failing like everything else. But the dark 
side of science seems to warrant more attention than is implied in the 
familiar protest that those with dubious intentions are misusing or 
abusing science. Perhaps we can better appreciate the multiple pos-
sibilities for corruption if we acknowledge that the total context in 
which science is done is value-full, that science is not a privileged 
value-free domain just because science claims objectivity, that value 
judgments pervade scientific activity and therefore are fair game for 
evaluation according to value standards and principles. This realization 
seems to have emerged very slowly because the myth of objective 
science has clouded our perception of the many value dimensions of 
modern science. This paper will review briefly a few key dimensions in 
order to place the myth in better perspective and encourage us to be 
more objective about objectivity in science and the possibilities for 
corruption in science. 
The myth of value-free, objective science has gradually evolved dur-
ing the last 250 years. Myth in this context can be defined as a unified 
set of symbols that elicits an imaginative response involving recurring 
patterns of belief, commitment, and action. Many people cite 
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Descartes's body-soul dualism as the beginning of the myth. Descartes 
turned the physical world into one vast complex machine divorced 
from intrinsic soul principles which are only to be found in rational 
human beings. The physical world therefore could be approached by 
the scientist, with the proper preparation and discipline of course, as 
"object," not eliciting or responding to emotion, interest or subjective 
bias. Ideally, values were irrelevant to the study of this mechanistic 
world. Human beings were the exception considered in that respect 
which was most human, most subjective and the source of values, the 
rational soul. Whatever the origins of the myth, it is still with us 
today, though shaken precisely because of value judgments by 
counter-culture and anti-science movements, citizen and consumer 
demand for greater accountability, congressional pressure to divert 
funds from basic to applied research, and growing concern among 
scientists like Chargaff who want to place limits on certain controver-
sial areas of research . 
First consider the myth in outline form. As French Nobel laureate 
Jacques Monod articulates it: 
The adoption of the scientific m ethod , defining "true" knowledge as having 
no possible source other than the objective confrontation of logic and 
observation, eliminates ipso facto the animist assumption of the existence of 
some kind of subjectivity in nature. The absolute objectivity of nature is the 
basic postulate of th e sci entific method . . .. 2 
Freedom of inquiry then must be protected at all costs so that 
scientists can be about their objective business of following well-
defined rules to accumulate data, establish facts and test hypotheses. 
Raising value issues and making value judgments are simply not the 
concern of scientists functioning as scientists. Nor is it a scientific 
concern that society may on occasion misuse or abuse the value-free, 
value-neutral results of scientific inquiry. Science indeed can show us 
how to achieve defined goals but not which goals to aim for. In sum, 
science deals with objective facts not subjective values. 
The purpose of this paper is not to aim one more attack at the 
myth of objective science in hopes of destroying it once and for all. 
Nietzsche, a would-be major myth killer in the 19th century, called 
for the " death of God," meaning that the Christian myth and concept 
of deity had outlived their usefulness and in fact were contributing to 
the disintegration of European civilization. For much the same reasons 
and in the same spirit, B. F. Skinner in Beyond Freedom and Dignity 
more recently has called for the death of the Autonomous Man or the 
myth of Individualism. It is certainly questionable whether the myth 
of objective science has outlived its usefulness. At least some 
demystifying is in order to temper misrepresentations of science that 
stress its near-absolute objectivity and value-free character. Insuffi-
cient attention has been given in the past to questions more or less 
appropriate to a philosophy of science. That is, what is the nature of 
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the scientific method, its underlying assumptions, its limits, and what 
is the significance of the total value context in which science operates? 
The responsibility for pursuing such questions rests with professionals 
in the sciences and the humanities as well. Science misunderstood in 
our society today inevitably will be science misused. And we all suffer 
the consequences, not just the Chargaffs. 
We intend the following discussion to be suggestive only - a chal-
lenge to professionals in the sciences and the humanities to create 
more cross-disciplinary opportunities for dialogue not only about 
vaiues in science, but also the worth of greater value awareness in 
science. The end result would be, perhaps, a healthier, more realistic 
"myth" of objective science, one of greater benefit to society in the 
long run. 
The thesis of this paper is that scientists may and indeed should 
aspire to even greater objectivity, but they and all of society should 
not underestimate or ignore the significance of the ever-present, value-
laden context in which science is done. 
For purposes of this paper, we will describe "value" as anything 
which can be conceptualized and prized, and both leads to action and 
serves as a standard of action. Without delving into the metaphysics of 
value, or various theories of ethics, or even deciding whether some 
values may be constant or absolute rather than relative from culture to 
culture, let us focus on the experienced fact that values are real in 
mind and in human behavior. An intelligent creature capable of having 
ideas is our starting point; experience reveals that certain ideas can 
acquire a quality or character of being of significance, relevance, 
importance, or desirability to the individual- in sum, prized. Such 
ideas I designate as incipient values. They merit the title of lived values 
when they become manifest in human behavior. Thinking about ideas 
is certainly action of a sort. But values are more strictly themselves 
when they serve as a springboard for overt externally manifest 
behavior. Hypocrisy is the name for values which remain incipient and 
are never translated into overt action. We are not always fully con-
scious of our values. But an analysis of our behavior or a process of 
values clarification can reveal those lived values which constitute our 
present value system. Every human being of course has such a system, 
whether or not the values that comprise it are consistent with one 
another. Coherent or not, the system may be broken down into 
categories such as political, economic, legal, socio-cultural, esthetic, 
and religious values. In any of these classifications, when a value 
assumes relatively major status and has bearing on what it means to 
lead the good life in some ultimate sense, we may designate such a 
value as moral or ethical. 
Moral and non-moral values are relational; that is, they signify that 
an individual is establishing connections with the world around him. 
Values exist primarily in our mind but have a vector quality. They give 
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direction to human behavior which in turn shapes the world of the 
individual according to how the individual thinks the world ought to 
be, not just how it is in fact. 
Because value decisions have to do with setting priorities for action, 
and because without setting priorities (detemining to do this rather 
than that) no action is really possible, value decisions, whether con-
scious or unconscious, are behind every instance of human activity. 
This point of view encompasses both trivial and momentous actions 
ranging from deciding whether to wear a tie or initiate all-out nuclear 
war. Even so-called spontaneous or random activity may involve value 
decisions. Painters in the action movement, for example, placed high 
value on the intuitive-instinctive process of producing a piece of art, 
rather than a more cerebral or rationally controlled process. "Spon-
taneity," of course, is just as much a value as "rational control." Value 
decisions, then, are as inevitable and as commonplace as directed 
human activity. If engaging in science is a directed human activity, it 
inevitably involves such jUdgments. 
The real issue, then, is not whether scientists can engage in value-free 
activity or refrain from making value judgments in science, but 
whether we can identify and clarify the more significant and, in partic-
ular, the ethical values which are actually involved in doing science in 
our society today. We assume that increasing sensitivity to value issues 
in science is a necessary condition for more responsible conduct of 
science as well as more responsible attitudes on the part of society 
toward science and its role in the world. 
The Training of a Scientist 
It is obvious that the scientist is not born or bred in an ivory tower, 
but is very much the product of his times and his society. Educational 
institutions, which provide the training ground for future scientists, 
tend to reinforce the dominant values of society. 
All students, for example, learn the basic lesson of competition 
among individuals. Traditional approaches in higher education stress 
the need to achieve mastery of subject matter in relation to other stu-
dents and often at the expense of the others. After all, the 
A-through-F grading system, to make any sense at all, requires some 
failures if there is to be any contrast between succeeding and failing. If 
everyone receives A, the grade is worthless. Those who are concerned 
about national trends toward grade inflation perceive correctly, it 
seems, that the inflation weakens the competitive system. There are 
other signs, however, that a reaction is setting in and the system will 
regain its previous "strength," such as it was. 
Does competition affect or infect the way science is done? Consider 
the following. From our own perspective it seems that for many scien-
tists science has become just another job (true of other professionals, 
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of course). A major objective, then, is staying on the job. For 
example, we could cite the figures which show the job picture for new 
physicists or whatever, is discouraging. The other side of that coin is 
that "old" physicists will be even harder pressed to survive on the job. 
Publish/produce or perish is a common enough refrain in higher educa-
tion. Visible, publicly acknowledged results are all. In such an environ-
ment it seems inevitable that quantity of output will begin to domin-
ate and quality and social relevance suffer. Yet journals proliferate to 
accommodate increasing demand from institutions and individuals. 
Ironically, possibly the most interesting scientific work is not pub-
lished at all because it must be kept secret for industrial or national 
security reasons. Journals do supply a forum for professionals to give 
evidence of continuing productivity, unmindful that the number of 
articles, like body counts in war, for example, may be a superficial and 
simplistic measure of success - certainly teaching success. One cause 
of superficiality is pressure to produce tangible results. This pressure 
must have import on the choice of problems to be studied and 
researched as well as the quality of effort that goes into the published 
product. 
Take the situation of an individual who is relatively insecure in his 
research job with an institution. The insecurity may lead the individ-
ual to consent to do research, or, in the extreme case, to falsify experi-
ments that he judges objectively ought not to be done. The justifica-
tion for participating may be that survival is at stake: providing for 
family, children's education, house payments, maintaining a certain 
level of affluence. There are two kinds of competing value judgments 
involved here. The researcher definitely affirms the importance of self 
and family survival, but he also affirms, through his behavior (even 
though there is a feeling of being compelled), the values and objectives 
of that institution which demands the research. 
Another alternative, of course, is to risk not surviving in whatever 
sense, and support values respecting scientific research which are in 
conflict with those of the institution. Non-survival in our society 
usually means sacrificing what is commonly understood as quality of 
life and rarely the fatal options of starvation, prison, or death which 
faced Russian scientists in the past and apparently continue into the 
present. 
If an individual is relatively secure in his research job, competition 
may take another form and move to a different level. Survival on the 
job may be replaced by such values as achievement of power, prestige, 
social privileges or intellectual superiority. These goals in turn dictate 
that research will be chosen which promotes achievement of just these 
goals. 
And whether we are dealing with the average scientist or the super-
achiever, competition to produce results seems to penalize the 
unorthodox, eccentric, maverick scientist. Perhaps Chargaff's life illus-
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trates this point. Part of the purpose of competition is to insure strict 
conformity to prevailing scientific practice. The same value of staying 
within accepted bounds is the rule in most institutions of higher learn-
ing as well. Again, this seems to affect the kind and quality of science 
and education we have in society today. 
The professionalization of knowledge tends to reinforce this con-
formism in science. Very early in his education the scientist learns that 
being a professional means becoming specialized in a particular region 
of thought. This is one way to make knowledge effective and research 
thorough, but it has its dangers. As A. N. Whitehead put it over 50 
years ago: 
It produces minds in a groove. Each profession makes progress, but it is 
progress in its own groove. Now to be mentally in a groove is to live in con-
templating a given set of abstractions. The groove prevents straying across 
country, and the abstraction abstracts from something to which no further 
attention is paid. But there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate 
for the comprehension of human life. Thus in the modern world, the celi-
bacy of the medieval learned class has been replaced by a celibacy of the 
intellect, which is divorced from the concrete contemplation of the com-
plete facts. Of course, no one is merely a mathematician, or merely a 
lawyer. People have lives outside their professions or their businesses. But 
the point is the restraint of serious thought within a groove. The remainder 
of life is treated superficially, with the imperfect categories of thought 
derived from one profession. 3 
Whitehead goes on to criticize traditional educational methods that 
have grown up with the ideal of professionalism and still prevail today. 
My own criticism of our traditional educational methods is that they are far 
too much occupied with intellectual analysis, and with the acquirement of 
formularized information. What I mean is, that we neglect to strengthen 
habits of concrete appreciation of the individual facts in their full interplay 
of emergent values, and that we merely emphasize abstract formulations 
which ignore this aspect of the interplay of diverse values. 4 
Overspecialization can lead to narrowing of vision concerning what 
constitutes a scientific problem. It can also lead to analysis of prob-
lems isolated from their real life value-laden context. Not that values 
can be eliminated from the analysis. Whitehead's point is that too 
often too few values are considered by the specialist, and this tends to 
distort the specialist's view of the way things really are. 
Interestingly enough, there is a good practical reason for avoiding 
overspecialization. In some fields there is a growing need to educate 
scientists to career alternatives in light of the job market crunch. 
Beverly J. Alexander, for example, cautions educators in chemistry: 
We must discourage some of our students from specializing too much 
because so many of today's problems are complex and cannot be solved by 
specialists alone. 
I think they are too important to leave entirely up to non-scientists. We 
chemists have a valuable contribution to make in areas such as energy, 
environment, conservation of natural resources, new materials, and food. 
And I don't think our contribution should be solely at the laboratory stage. 5 
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Whether for practical reasons or as a matter of principle, we may 
agree with the need to encourage more of a balance between general-
ized and specialized education and with the importance of multi-dis-
ciplinary approaches for dealing with complex, multi-faceted problems 
in contemporary society. 
We should mention briefly two other areas of concern that seem to 
be connected with the notions of competition and professionalism. 
Besides competition within a profession, professions as institutions 
have a tendency to be in competition with one another over the 
limited economic resources of society. Many problems and issues are 
involved here. Let us focus on just one. In the context of intra- and 
inter-professional competition, scientists along with the rest of society 
seem conditioned to accept without question the value that scientific 
knowledge is private property and that an individual succeeds by 
accumulating the most or the best or by selling it for profit. In our 
society this is not an unusual development . We do have other models, 
however, present and past. There was a time when scholarly work was 
not signed, when plagiarism was not a problem, because scholars were 
accustomed to duplicating the work of others without acknowledge-
ment, adding to it and passing it on in the name of enriching the 
intellectual heritage of mankind. 6 In our society, and perhaps rightly 
so, we are definitely in the age of individual right to private property, 
of copyrights and patents, and plagiarism as an evil. It still seems 
important to raise the question: is scientific knowledge best understood 
as a commodity, produced and owned by individuals, to be used for 
bartering in the marketplace? The same basic question has been asked 
about health care, for example: is it a right, a privilege, or a com-
modity that goes to the highest bidder? Is private property the best 
model we have for understanding these issues? It goes without saying, 
private property is a paramount value in our society. Scientists need to 
ask, is it central to the development of scientific knowledge? Should it 
be? 
A second area of concern has to do with the type of person who 
becomes a scientist. Like other professions in our society, competition 
for membership results in a majority of scientists being white males 
from middle-class backgrounds. Upon graduation they return to the 
middle or upper-middle class. The relative exclusion of lower classes, 
minorities and women from science professions suggests the need for 
critical questioning. Does the under-representation of groups just men-
tioned deprive science of needed perspective that could make a differ-
ence in the kind of problems selected for study and research? Alfred 
McClung Lee, in his presidential address to the American Sociological 
Association in 1976, observed that sociologists "usually do not 
transcend their own habitual intellectual orientations related to their 
sex, social class, ethnic, racial, and other identities." 7 Background 
undoubtedly colors scientific inquiry in the social and behavioral 
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sciences. The amount and degree of coloring may be different, but we 
suggest that the natural sciences are not exempt from the problem. 
The question is, in what sense is science human? Howard Smith, from 
the University of California at Berkeley, once stated, "The 'humanity' 
of physics resides with my own humanity. Physics is human because I 
am human and not because it has something 'to do with human 
relations.' ,,8 We can agree with the concept, but then wonder to what 
extent the values and background of the man carryover into his 
physics . 
Are scientists self-critical enough to be aware of the values at stake? 
For instance, it is still both fashionable and economically and polit-
ically profitable to be a part of the war on cancer. In comparison, 
there are only minor skirmishes against malnutrition or tropical dis-
eases, for example, which plague a sizeable portion of the world's non-
white population. Should we expect white male middle-class scientists 
to have values any different from those of society's mainstream? 
Perhaps not. But neither should we blindly accept the sort of argu-
ments which claim the values of scientists as persons who have nothing 
to do with dictating the direction of the science they do. 
Dominant social values pervade the training and shaping of the 
scientist. The value system of the scientist in the concrete necessarily 
influences the science. This makes even more sense if we stop to think 
that scientific knowledge does not have independent existence once 
produced. Science primarily exists in a human mind thinking scientif-
ically - the same mind that continuously makes value judgments. In 
the real world it seems impossible to separate the person who is scien-
tist from the science. 
Technological Applications of Science 
Similarly, it seems impossible to separate science from related tech-
nological applications. This is contrary to the usual reading of the 
myth of objective science: the production of scientific knowledge is 
one thing; the use or misuse of that knowledge is something altogether 
different. The myth presents science as value-neutral and therefore 
somehow beyond good and evil. 
This aspect of the myth made more sense in pre-modern times. 
John Dewey discusses the origin of what he calls the spectator theory 
of knowledge. In the ancient Greek world, theorizing in general was 
the prerogative of the privileged leisure class. Their meditation or 
contemplation of the truth was not to be tarnished by association 
with daily, routine practical matters. Such was the responsibility of 
the lower classes. Knowledge, therefore, was strictly theory, a way of 
"looking on" the world like a spectator, rather than a way of being 
actively involved in the world. Thinking was not connected with 
making or doing. Theory and practice were kept distinct. 
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This dualism was plausible perhaps until Francis Bacon in the early 
17th century urged science to aim at power over nature for the pur-
pose of improving the material conditions of existence. Knowledge is 
power to control and manipulate nature. As Bacon puts it, "Human 
knowledge and human power meet in one." 9 Consequently, theory 
and practice must be intrinsically connected. Today we have come to 
realize, some would say with a vengeance, Bacon's ideal of taking full 
advantage of the theory/practice connection. 
The value of "knowledge for its own sake" may still inspire some 
scientists. But it never was true, psychologically or any other way, 
that the search for scientific knowledge only affected the researcher 
and never other human beings or the environment. There is no such 
thing as knowledge without effect in the world. The growing inter-
connection between the enterprises of science and technology merely 
sharpens our perception of this fact. "Scientific knowledge for its 
products or benefits" has all but replaced the ancient ideal of pure, 
disinterested theory. 
Can there be serious doubt that technology is wedded to science, 
for better or worse? There is no branch of science in which discoveries 
do not have some technological applicability. Every discovery invites 
consideration of technological applications even to the point of 
initiating new technologies. Hans Jonas shows very convincingly that 
the relationship is causal, not just accidental. 
First, much of science lives on the intellectual feedback from precisely its 
technological applications. 
Second , science receives from technology its assignments: in what direc· 
tion to search, what problems to solve. 
Third, for solving these problems, and generally for its own advance, 
science uses advanced technology itself: its physical tools become ever more 
demanding. In this sense, even purest science now has a stake in technology, 
as technology has in science. 
Fourth, the cost of those physical tools and of the staff to use them must 
be underwritten from outside. The mere economics of the case calls in the 
public purse or other sponsorship; and this funding of th e scientist's project 
(even with "no strings attached"), is naturally given in the expecta tion of 
some future retu rn in the practical sphere. 
There is mutual understanding on this . The anticipated payoff is put 
forward unashamedly as the recommending rationale in seeking grants or is 
specified outright as the purpose in offering them. 
In sum, science has its tasks increasi ngly set by extraneous interests rather 
than its own internal logic or the free curiousity of the invest igator . This is 
not to disparage those extraneous interests nor the fact that scie nce has 
become their servant, that is, part of the social enterprise. 
But it is to say that the acceptance of this functional role (withou t which 
there would be neither science of the advanced type we have nor the type of 
society living by its fruits) has destroyed the alibi of pure, disinterested 
theory. It has pu t science squarely in the realm of social act ion where every 
agent is accountable for his or her deeds.lO 
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Where scientific knowledge is power to be applied in the world, by 
necessity moral value and moral responsibility come into play. The 
greater the power the greater the responsibility. Scientists, because of 
their vantage point on the inside of the process, perhaps more than the 
general public, must accept responsibility for technological applica-
tions of their science. 
Scientific Method Itself 
Sandwiched between the topics of the "training of a scientist" and 
the "technological applications of science" we find the meat of the 
myth of objective science - the scientific method itself. There are 
those who might admit at this point that value judgments are involved 
in the decision to become a scientist in the first place, and later a 
specialist; in the selection of problems or foci of interest for investiga-
tion; and in the technological applications of theory. But they still 
might resist concluding that value jUdgments are intrinsic to the pro-
cedures of science, the scientific method itself. If extra-scientific value 
judgments get mixed up in science, they say, this is more a com-
mentary on the limitations of the scientist than the method since the 
scientific method is only a tool which does not logically involve value 
jUdgments. 
A number of commentators in recent years have raised serious ques-
tions about the idea of a value-free method. Let me briefly summarize 
a few main points. 
T. S. Kuhn in his landmark work The Structure of Scientific Revo-
lutions 11 shows the significance of paradigms in normal scientific 
activity. He describes paradigms as "universally recognized scientific 
achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions 
to a community of practitioners." 12 In other words, normal scientific 
activity is governed by some basic theory which is accepted as true 
and has been applied to many of the problems in the field. The goal of 
continuing scientific activity is the successful use of the established 
theory to solve the remaining problems in the field. 
Kuhn notes that normal, but not revolutionary, science tends to be 
dogmatic. The typical scientist is not concerned with validating the 
paradigm-theory: he merely accepts it, consciously or unconsciously, 
and then spends his time articulating the paradigm and interpreting 
new data according to it. Kuhn claims this dogmatism has many 
advantages. He even thinks that the presence of a paradigm can aid in 
the recognition of the need for revolutionary change to new 
paradigms. 
The main point for our purposes is that Kuhn shows very clearly 
that adherence to a paradigm in science is a matter of sharing certain 
values and standards, rules, assumptions, and points of view in a scien-
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tific community. In effect, a paradigm defines a certain value context 
which includes the values of the paradigm and excludes other possible 
values. The value context in turn guides the use of the scientific 
method in relation to the paradigm. 
Other commentators have focused on the traditional distinction 
between theory and observation. N. R. Hanson, Paul Feyerbend, 
Henry Margenau and others try to show that all observation is theory-
laden, that we build our theories into our observation more than we 
build our observations into our theories. This means it is not possible 
to isolate a class of scientific statements which can be known directly 
and from which the remainder can be inferred by some inductive 
scheme. Observations as well as theories must be dependent on infer-
ences. In other terms, reasoned judgments rather than so-called acts of 
simple observation are the basis for determining the acceptability of 
scientific data. What seems to be implied in this analysis of the theory-
observation relationship is that every theory constitutes a value or 
value-system which functions as a standard for selecting data relevant 
to that theory. This would be consistent with the above interpretation 
of Kuhn. 
Richard Rudner was one of the first philosophers of science to call 
attention to the role of value judgments in the "acceptance" of scien-
tific theories. His premise is that validating hypotheses is intrinsic to 
the scientific method. That is, the scientist is in the business of decid-
ing when a hypothesis is true enough. Since perfect verification is not 
possible, the scientist must decide when the available evidence is 
" 'sufficiently' strong or that the probability is 'sufficiently' high to 
warrant the acceptance of the hypothesis." 13 "Strong enough," 
according to Rudner, involves a value judgment concerning the 
importance of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting the hypoth-
esis. He asks, for example, 
how high a degree of probability the Manhattan Project scientists demanded 
for the hypothesis that no uncontrollable pervasive chain reaction would 
occur before they proceeded with the first atomic bomb detonation or even 
first activated the Chicago pile above a critical level. It would be equally 
interesting and instructive to know how they decided that the chosen prob-
ability value (if one was chosen) was high enough rather than one that was 
higher; on the other hand , it is conceivable that the problem, in this form, 
was not brought to consciousness at all. 14 
The issue is whether a mistake would make any significant difference 
according to our moral standards. "How sure we must be before we 
accept a hypothesis depends on how serious a mistake would be."15 
Rudner implies, I think, that we have entered a new era. Gathering 
evidence is not simply a function of innocent observation. Active 
intervention in nature or experimentation is critical to all of modern 
science; animate nature is becoming more and more the subject of 
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experimentation. A scientifically controlled atomic explosion may 
serve the interests of some theory or other. But it inevitably affects 
the whole atmosphere and therefore human life present and future. 
The exploding field of biomedical research even more graphically 
demands, not just occasions, experimentation on human subjects 
present and future. But when the animate world itself becomes the 
laboratory, experimentation and scientific method with it lose their 
innocence, and moral issues command attention. 
Rudner offers an excellent conclusion to this section and our paper 
as a whole: 
The traditional search for objectivity exemplifies science's pursuit of one 
of its most precious ideals. For the scientist to close his eyes to the fact that 
scientific method intrinsically requires the making of value decisions, and 
for him to push out of his consciousness the fact that he does make them 
can in no way bring him closer to the ideal of objectivity. To refuse to pay 
attention to the value decisions that must be made, to make them intui· 
tively, unconsciously, and haphazardly, is to leave an essential aspect of 
scientific method scientifically out of control. 
What seems necessary ... is nothing less than a radical reworking of the 
ideal of scientific objectivity. The naive conception of the scientist as one 
who is cold· blooded, emotionless, impersonal, and passive, mirroring the 
world perfectly in the highly polished lenses of his steel·rimmed glasses is no 
longer, if it ever was, adequate. 
What is proposed here is that objectivity for science lies at least in becom· 
ing precise about what value judgments are being made and might have been 
made in a given inquiry - and, stated in the most challenging form, what 
value decisions ought to be made. 16 
As a final comment, we should re-emphasize the idea that the 
"radical reworking of the ideal of scientific objectivity" be the respon-
sibility of a cross-disciplinary effort involving both scientists and 
humanists. Perhaps a concerted effort would provide better perspec-
tive on the issue of corruption in contemporary science. Then we can 
see how much help Chargaff deserves at the levee. 
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